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NO COMITY IN ERROR : ASYLUM AND « WARS OF CHOICE » 
1. Introduction 
On 29 October 2004, a U.K. Immigration Appeal Tribunal (« I.A.T. ») 
granted the asylum appeal of a Russian military deserter named Andrey 
Krotov (« AK »).1 AK, a Russian citizen born in 1977, had initially evaded 
military service in the Russian army in 1996 when he first became eligible 
to serve.2 In January 2000, after call-up and three months of training, 
he was sent to Grozny, in Chechnya. He deserted shortly afterwards. 
He made his way, via Ukraine, to the U.K., where, on arrival in February 
2000, he claimed asylum immediately, pursuant to the United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and Protocol of 
1967 («the Convention »).3 
On 1 June 2001, the Home Office deemed AK to be an illegal entrant, 
and removal directions were served upon him. AK appealed to the 
Asylum Adjudicator, but the appeal was dismissed in a determination 
dated 20 December 2001, on the grounds that his situation did not 
engage the Convention grounds for refugee status. AK then appealed 
to the I.A.T. Following a hearing on 22 April 2002, it issued its 
determination on 2 May 2002, dismissing AK's appeal against the 
Adjudicator's decision. However, it granted leave to appeal to the 
Court of Appeal on the ground that it was arguable «the Adjudicator's 
findings on the applicant's objections to performing military service 
are flawed ».4 
In its judgement dated 11 February 2004, the Court of Appeal5 allowed 
AK's appeal. It held that refugee status could be available to a post-
desertion applicant if he believed he could be required to participate in 
military action involving breaches of the basic rules of human conduct. 
Such an applicant needed to show that there had been a systematic 
basis for the inhumane acts he might otherwise have been required to 
carry out, as a result of deliberate policy or official indifference. The 
Court of Appeal then remitted the case to the I.A.T. for reconsideration of 
all the relevant materials placed before it in order to ascertain whether 
AK could provide sufficient evidence of the realities of the war in Chechnya 
in relation to the level and nature of the conflict at the time of his desertion 
(1999 - 2000), and the attitude of the Russian Government towards it. 
The I.A.T. conducted this reconsideration on 18 May 2004, issued its 
judgement on 29 October, and allowed AK's appeal. It concluded, in 
paragraph 31 of its determination, that 
... [0]n the evidence which we have had as to the position at what 
we have taken as the relevant time, we have concluded that the 
evidence shows that breaches of the basic rules of human conduct 
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are sufficiently widespread that it should be inferred that the Appellant 
was at a real risk of being required to participate in such acts in the 
broad sense described, that he would have been formally or 
informally punished for any refusal to do so, and that fear of the 
consequences was a significant part of his claim for asylum. 
Fundamental to the issue of AK's asylum claim was whether his desertion 
from the Russian army could be placed within the Convention definition 
of«refugee » so as to entitle him to seek asylum.6 This definition is given 
in Article 1 A(2) of the Convention,7 and applies to any person who, 
[OJwing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
« Convention reasons » as listed in Article 1A(2) must normally be 
personal, and assessed on an individual basis.8 As explained in the 
U.N. High Commission for Refugees Handbook,9 the original 1951 
Convention was designed to co-ordinate assistance to refugees 
uprooted by World War 2; its 1967 Protocol effectively allows state 
parties to apply the Convention to new situations as and when they 
should occur.10 Consideration of refugee status pursuant to the 
Convention is thus a matter of treaty obligation, while procedures for 
doing so are left to individual member states.11 
There is no automatic entitlement to refugee status merely due to the 
consequences of an armed conflict.12 Similarly, « [a] person is clearly 
not a refugee if his only reason for desertion or draft-evasion is his 
dislike of military service or fear of combat ».13 However, AK's objection 
to the war in Chechnya was to his probable participation in « actions 
which breach the basic rules of human conduct in war ».14 Accordingly, 
his disagreement with that war amounted to a political opinion, 
punishment for which created his « well-founded fear of persecution ». 
AK's argument had failed initially before the Adjudicator, who had ruled 
that a maximum term of 7 years imprisonment by the Russian Federation 
for desertion did not amount to persecution.1S The Court of Appeal, however, 
instructed the I.A.T. to adopt a two-staged test, and thereby to link the 
cause of AK's flight (the inhumane manner in which the Russian Federation 
pursued its campaign in 1999 - 2000 against the Chechen separatists) to 
the likely result of desertion (persecution-by-imprisonment).16 In other words, 
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once evidence of a systematic pattern to abhorrent acts carried out in a 
particular conflict had been produced, it was then open to a court to 
determine whether fear of punishment for refusing to participate in it was 
the genuine reason motivating the asylum claim. 
This altered framework of analysis allowed the I.AT. to observe, in 
pertinent part, that 
[Although ...] soldiers may be able to decline to participate actively 
in atrocities without punishment..., it is not necessarily so clear that 
those who are not punished for not actively participating in repugnant 
activities should be regarded as not persecuted We also do 
not regard it as impossible for there to be policies ..., breaches of 
which do not lead to punishment but which can lead to ostracism 
by fellow soldiers or non-promotion; those constitute pressures which 
should not be ignored ... . It should not be assumed that the only 
basis for showing a « requirement » to participate is a formal or 
informal punishment system.17 
It then concluded that, on the evidence, 
[Breaches of the basic rules of human conduct are sufficiently 
widespread that it should be inferred that the Appellant was at a real 
risk of being required to participate in such acts in the broad sense 
described, that he would have been formally or informally punished 
for any refusal to do so, and that fear of the consequences was a 
significant part of his claim for asylum.18 
The Convention is silent as to conscientious objection. Fortunately for 
AK, he won his appeal, yet it is disturbing that, of three issues raised -
the state use of armed force, the means and methods utilised, and the 
state's power to compel military service, only one was decisive to AK's 
claim for asylum: the means and methods utilised. The underlying 
rationale for the use of force, and the right to object on grounds of 
conscience were deemed non-justiciable. Of these latter two issues, it 
is arguably the judicial acceptance of the state's power to compel 
military service that carries the greatest potential for international harm 
at present. 
A state's power to compel military service can signal a lack of democratic 
transparency. Accordingly, this discussion is structured as follows. In 
Part 2, the non-availability of a right, either« absolute » or« partial», of 
conscientious objection, is reviewed. In Part 3, the non-justiciability of 
aggression is outlined, in order to foreground the serious consequences 
entailed by a state's power to compel. In Part 4, the economic and 
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human ramifications of compulsion are then considered. It is concluded 
that« wars of choice »in particular will continue to provide a rich source 
of highly problematic claims for political asylum. 
2. Conscientious Objection 
The Handbook notes that where military service is compulsory, the 
failure to perform this duty is invariably made a criminal offence.19 Failure 
to serve can take two forms: desertion, and refusal. Desertion is viewed 
seriously as it may increase the dangers posed to those who do not 
desert, and can be subsumed in a charge for treason. A refusal to serve 
is simply unlawful conduct. Alternatively, a legal substitute may be 
available, either in the form of national civilian service and/or a stance 
of conscientious objection. Compulsory military service thus exhibits 
the ongoing tension between individual rights and duties in relation to 
the state - a tension reflected in the degree of cultural relativism still 
tolerated world-wide in many legal areas. This section considers specific 
aspects of the practice. 
2A. The Prevalence of Conscription 
Compulsory military service is decided on a state-by-state basis. Different 
domestic perceptions of military need are the result. Even in those 
states in which service substitution or conscientious objection is 
available, the basis for military exemption differs. In contrast, whether a 
« human right» of conscientious objection even exists was reviewed in 
an earlier asylum case by the Court of Appeal,20 and subsequently 
discussed by the House of Lords.21 In Sepef two Turkish men of Kurdish 
origin separately evaded compulsory conscription in Turkey on the 
grounds that neither wished to run the risk of eventual participation in 
military action in Kurdish areas of the country.22 Turkish law does not 
provide any non-combatant alternative to military service, and evaders 
are liable to prison sentences of between 6 months and 3 years, 
irrespective of the reasons for their refusal to serve.23 
The claims in Sepet for asylum in the U.K. were first rejected by the 
Secretary of State, and subsequently by the Special Adjudicator, the 
I.A.T., and the Court of Appeal.24 In also rejecting the appeals, the House 
of Lords examined the extent to which any uniformity of state practice 
exists in relation to the issue of compulsory conscription. It found that, 
while most European states either have no conscription or provide 
alternatives, of 180 states surveyed in a War Registers International 
report (1998), some form of conscription exists in 95, 52 of which 
recognise no right of conscientious objection.25 A further 7 states make 
no such provision. Nor could a «right» of conscientious objection be 
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discerned from the available evidence of human rights law in relation to 
the prohibition of involuntary servitude.26 By way of example, Lord 
Bingham27 pointed to the express exclusion from the prohibition of 
«forced or compulsory labour »found in Article 8(3)(c)(ii) of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights : 
8(3)(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term « forced or 
compulsory labour » shall not include: ... 
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where 
conscientious objection is recognised, any national service 
required by law of conscientious objectors. 
A « right » of conscientious objection as an aspect of the freedoms of 
thought, conscience and religion was also discounted.28 Instead, the 
converse was held to be true: states are deemed to have a right to 
compel military service, and to punish military refuseniks under domestic 
criminal law. 
2B. Refusals to Serve 
In relation to AK, this aspect of Sepetwas further refined by the Court of 
Appeal. Neatly side-stepping an accusation that it was « attempting to 
spell out an exemption from a generally-recognised power to compel 
citizens to fight »,29 the Court of Appeal felt the prevalence of particularly 
violent acts seen in some wars arguably would better substantiate a 
refusal to serve in them. If this were the case, punishment could constitute 
persecution. In respect of the evidentiary burden on an asylum seeker 
to prove such acts were occurring at the relevant time, the Court clearly 
preferred domestic courts to apply an international law test in order to 
verify the true motives for a post-desertion asylum claim. It concluded 
that courts must 
[H]ave regard to the realities of the particular conflict in which an 
applicant has refused to participate rather than to the specific question 
whether or not that conflict has yet been internationally condemned.30 
As for AKs « partial» political belief, or conscientious objection to the war 
in Chechnya, recognition as a refugee had to be based on the genuineness 
of his « political, religious, moral or conscientious objection to military 
action in general ».31 As noted by the Court of Appeal,« he had no general 
objection to performing military service ».32 This « partial » objection to 
military service however had previously led the Adjudicator to view 
AK's claim to refugee status with scepticism. He concluded : 
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25. He does not qualify for refugee status since, according to my 
reading of his evidence, he has no genuine political, religious, moral 
or conscientious objection to military action in general 33 
AK's human rights claims on the basis of Articles 2, 3, 6, and 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights34 were similarly dismissed : 
The extrajudicial executions of deserters during the period 1994 to 
1996 have apparently long since ceased. It cannot be said that 
imprisonment for a maximum term of seven years for desertion during 
a war is disproportionate and there is no evidence that any 
punishment suffered by the Appellant would be disproportionately 
severe for any Convention reason.35 
On granting leave to appeal to AK, the I.A.T. posed the following 
question : 
Does a particular war need to have been internationally condemned 
before an asylum seeker can succeed in a claim under the Refugee 
Convention on the basis of a partial objection to it? If yes, has the 
conflict in Chechnya been internationally condemned? If no, does 
it meet whatever is the appropriate test ?36 
The issue of the test to be applied arose due to a conflict at I.A.T. level, 
as guidance from the Handbook, paragraph 171, was unclear: 
Not every [conscientious objector] conviction, genuine though it may 
be, will constitute a sufficient reason for claiming refugee status after 
desertion or draft-evasion. It is not enough for a person to be in 
disagreement with his government regarding the political justification 
for a particular military action. Where, however, the type of military 
action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is 
condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic 
rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft evasion 
could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself 
be regarded as persecution. [Emphasis added.] 
In the earlier case of Foughali v. S.O.S.H.D.,31 an I.A.T. panel decided 
that the appropriate test should be determined on the basis of« sufficient 
objective evidence of violations of the basic rules of human conduct ».38 
However, the I.A.T. panel in AK's case preferred a conflict first to have 
been internationally condemned, in order to avoid judicial comment 
on events occurring elsewhere. 
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In AK, the approach in Foughaliwas preferred. As noted by Potter, L.J., 
[W]hile it must be acknowledged that the Convention itself is silent 
as to conscientious objection and the norms of international law, I 
consider that the terms of the Handbook and court decisions have 
recognised a point at which punishment for objection to participation 
in a particular conflict on grounds of its legality may properly be 
regarded as establishing persecution for the purposes of the 
Convention. 
The basis upon which they have done so is ... by treating a genuine 
conscientious refusal to participate in a conflict in order to avoid 
participating in inhumane acts required as a matter of state policy 
or systematic practice, as amounting to an (implied or imputed) 
political opinion as to the limits of governmental authority, which 
thereby attracts the protection of the Convention ... .39 
[W]hilst«international condemnation »is serviceable for descriptive 
purposes, it does not define the category. Strictly speaking 
international condemnation is only one indicator - albeit a highly 
relevant one - of whether the armed conflict involved is/would be 
contrary to international law.40 
Accordingly, the phrase « type of military action ... condemned by the 
international community as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct »41 
cannot extend to a war in principle; justiciability is confined to an 
evaluation of relevant, objective evidence as to the manner in which a 
war is fought. Any « window of opportunity » for a successful post-
desertion asylum claim thus remains very small indeed. 
3. The « International Law Test », and Justiciability 
The international law test approved by the Court of Appeal requires the 
military conduct of a war to be examined in order to gauge whether or 
not it is in compliance with international humanitarian law, e.g., that 
contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the laws of armed conflict, 
and their two 1977 Protocols.42 The Court further confirmed that the 
phrase « basic rules of human conduct» has a distinct legal meaning 
both within the international law of armed conflicts, and international 
human rights law.43 It noted that an international law test facilitated a 
better approach to desertion cases, for which « international 
condemnation » provided one « highly relevant»indicator.44 This section 
considers in turn some current problems with this test. 
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3A. The « International Law Test » 
Once the I.A.T. agreed that Russian forces had breached the rules of human 
conduct at the relevant time, it then went on to assess whether AK might, 
or would have been required to participate in such actions. Available 
evidence included a 2001 U.S. State Department Report on Russia, C.I.RU. 
Reports of 2000 and 2001, an Amnesty International Report for 2000, and 
Human Rights Watch Reports for 2000 and 2001.45 The panel then 
considered written representations from the U.N. Human Rights 
Commissioner after a visit to Chechnya in Spring 2000, and Resolutions 
adopted in 2000 and 2001 by the U.N.H.R.C.46 The Council of Europe, in 
its investigation of conditions in Chechnya, elicited unsatisfactory replies 
from Russia, and in early 2001, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe passed its own Resolution expressing concerns.47 
As noted by the I.A.T., the many reports recognised that « such 
international condemnation as there was related not to the war in 
principle but to the disproportionate force used in its conduct »,48 and 
that due to limited reporting and « no real effort by the Russians to 
investigate »,49 the evidence was general, and often based on hearsay. 
Nevertheless, it concluded in pertinent part that 
... [A]t least during this period of large scale conflict the evidence 
shows that breaches of those basic rules were widespread The 
evidence suggests that the Russians had something to be ashamed 
of and, knowing that, sought to preclude outside scrutiny.50 
The I.A.T. then confined this conclusion specifically : 
[T]he condemnation relates to the absence of investigations and to 
the manner of the conduct of the war. This perhaps adds to the 
sense of not having a specific test of international condemnation for 
these purposes'.51 
This limited determination reflects the fact that, despite the very real 
progress made in the modern era to restrain the outbreak of armed 
conflict, wars continue to occur. In view of the incomplete nature of 
international criminal justice, the underlying rationale for the use of 
force in any given armed conflict remains beyond the scope of 
independentjudicial enquiry.52 Indeed, to focus attention on the modern 
restraint of inter-state war is to misconceive not only the traditional 
usefulness to states of war, but further, to ignore the political space within 
which states endeavour to retain the right to use armed force. As such, 
« aggression »remains a political, rather than a legal, concept.53 
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The background to this situation is straight-forward enough. The 
«justness » of the use of armed force became a real issue during the 
League of Nations era,54 and efforts were made throughout the 1920s 
to restrain what had previously been viewed as a right. The Kellogg-
Briand Pact of 192855 was one such attempt. Legally speaking, the 
Pact did not prohibit war,56 yet it was referred to by the Military War 
Crimes Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War 2 as one 
basis for the condemnation of Axis crimes against the peace.57 As for 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and two associated Protocols of 1977, 
the rules for international(-ised) and non-international armed conflicts 
are kept clearly separate;58 it has been left largely to the human rights 
organisations to press for a more comprehensive approach to the use 
of armed force.59 
Although efforts to deter armed conflicts have generally operated better 
through U.N. frameworks,60 one crucial perspective which should be 
maintained is that it is only in relation to the rationale for which a war is 
waged that contemporary attitudes have altered. No express provision 
is made in the Charter for civil wars or non-international armed conflicts 
- the most frequently-occurring type of armed conflict.61 U.N. member 
states are bound by Charter Article 2(4) not to use or threaten to use 
armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes 
of the U.N.,62 and Charter Article 51 memorialises the inherent right of 
self-defence.63 As for collective self-defence, the international community 
remains dependent on so-called coalitions of the willing,64 as an 
autonomous armed force for the U.N. has never been formed.65 
It is thus not yet open to the courts independently to differentiate 
between those armed conflicts which involve some context of national 
self-defence or other pursuit of U.N. purposes, and those which do 
not. The U.N. Security Council has a primary obligation under Chapter 
VII of the Charter to determine whether breaches of, or threats to, 
international peace and security have occurred, and what action to 
take. Although such a determination will have the force of law,66 the 
Security Council need not consult law in its handling of disputes,67 and 
Charter Article 103 permits it to modify the application of traditional 
rules of customary law in a given situation.68 Such a political discretion 
alone leads to heightened sensitivity regarding the demands of 
international comity. 
Moreover, aggression, as a legal concept, remains without a definition 
in international law. Adoption of U.N.G.A. Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974, on a Definition of Aggression, was by consensus vote; 
the definition is thus political.69 Unless there is U.N. Security Council 
61 
Elizabeth CHADWICK 
condemnation of an internal armed conflict pursuant to Chapter VII of 
the Charter, the term « aggression »is generally assumed to characterise 
only state-to-state uses of armed force. Whether the term can ever be 
used independently to describe military action taken domestically within 
sovereign territory remains highly controversial.70 Alternatively, the new 
International Criminal Court (« I.C.C. ») will have jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, but only as of 2009.71 
Otherwise, a situation of aggression might be « discovered » by ex 
poste analysis of state action taken against attack, pursuant to Article 
51.72 However, as was confirmed by the Nuremberg Military War Crimes 
Tribunal, a legal right of self-defence is confined by the narrow and 
rather obsolete framework of the Caroline case of 1837,73 and ostensibly 
requires an armed attack to occur, first. More realistically, there is a 
growing recognition of an extension of this doctrine to encompass 
anticipatory, or pre-emptive self-defence, but that, too, remains 
controversial as one state's pre-emptive self-defence can resemble 
another state's view of aggression.74 
Therefore, the scope of independent judicial analysis is constricted. 
Although an international law test in post-desertion asylum cases affords 
a greater degree of discretion within which international condemnation 
may play a supporting role, the known pitfalls of international comity 
must be contemplated. Potter, L.J., carefully remarks on the dangers 
of jurisdictional over-reach, as follows : 
In dealing with such matters, the courts of this country are not 
purporting to exercisejurisdiction, whether territorial or international, 
over the national of another state in respect of an internationally 
recognised crime alleged against him, as in the case of General 
Pinochet,75 but are examining the conditions existing and actions 
taking place abroad for the purpose of deciding the rights of asylum 
recognised and afforded in this country to refugees. While it may 
be that, in other areas of itsjurisdiction, the English court is reluctant 
to adjudicate upon the nature or legality of actions taking place 
abroad, it does not shy away from doing so when such a process is 
an inevitable ingredient of the jurisdiction to be exercised.76 
3B. The Justiciability of « Aggression » 
Recent cases in the U.K. have confirmed the present non-justiciability 
of« aggression*. In The Campaign forNuclear Disarmament («CND») 
v. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,11 an advisory declaration 
by judicial review was sought of the meaning of U.N. Security Council 
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Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 - in particular, whether Iraqi non-
compliance with its terms permitted third states to take military action. 
The case, a thinly-veiled challenge to the legality of U.K. participation 
in the 2003 Iraq war, was dismissed as non-justiciable by a Divisional 
Court of three.78 The Court held it was unnecessary to interpret Resolution 
1441 to determine personal rights or duties under domestic law. The 
Resolution had not been incorporated into English domestic law, and 
even if it had been, the Court would still so decline if to do so would be 
damaging to the public interest in the field of international relations, 
national security or defence. Moreover, the Court found there to be no 
sound basis for believing the U.K. Government had been wrongly 
advised as to the true position in international law. 
Subsequently, in Jones and Milling, et al. v. Gloucestershire Crime 
Prosecution Service,79 the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) similarly 
concluded that the defendants' belief in the illegality of U.K. participation 
in the 2003 Iraqi war provided no defence, for purposes of Criminal 
Law Act 1967, section 3, to a charge of criminal damage. Unlike in 
CND, the defendants in Jones & Milling, et al., argued that personal 
rights and duties under domestic law were at issue: a perceived duty 
to act to thwart the U.K.'s « unlawful » participation had made them 
subject to criminal prosecution. They had been charged with various 
offences of criminal damage, arson and conspiracy to cause criminal 
damage in March 2003 at R.A.F. Fairford - at the time, a 24-hour 
operational military airbase, a N.A.T.O. stand-by base, and base for 
visiting Allied U.S. forces. When arrested, the defendants indicated 
their intention had been to prevent the U.S. and the U.K. from using the 
base for war crimes in Iraq. 
The appeal originated from a hearing preparatory to trial, in which Bristol 
Crown Court had ruled against the defendants, as a belief in the illegality 
of the war against Iraq, and of the U.K.'s participation in it, were simply 
not relevant to any defence available to them. The Court of Appeal was 
largely in agreement, and its analysis of the justiciability of an 
international« crime » of aggression is enlightening.80 After first reviewing 
the Crown Court's ruling as to the relevant elements of domestic criminal 
law, and noting that the word « crime » in s. 3 of the Criminal Law Act 
1967 means a « crime in domestic law », the Court of Appeal, stated, in 
pertinent part, as follows : 
Whether the alleged international crime of aggression is a crime in 
domestic law depends upon the effect of public international law 
rules in English Law.81 
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The Court briefly reviewed relevant domestic authorities on the subject, 
and further reasoned, in pertinent part : 
There is no doubt, therefore, that a rule of international law is capable 
of being incorporated into English law if it is an established rule derived 
from one or more of the recognised sources, that is a clear consensus, 
evidenced by the writings of scholars or otherwise, or by treaty 
In our view, the question as to whether or not a rule of international 
law forms part of English law is governed by the principle of certainty; 
and the question as to whether or not it constitutes a crime depends 
upon an analysis of whether or not a breach of the rule can properly 
result in penal consequences. The mere fact that an act can clearly 
be established to be proscribed by international law, and is described 
as « a crime » does not necessarily of itself determine its character in 
domestic law unless its characteristics are such that it can be translated 
into domestic law in a way which would entitle domestic courts to 
impose punishment.82 
The Court of Appeal then examined authorities further afield, such as 
the Nuremberg Charter, and the Rome Statute of the I.C.C. In relation 
to crimes against the peace, or« aggression », the Court preferred not 
to pronounce on whether the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military War Crimes 
Tribunals were exercising jurisdiction as courts under the Agreement 
and Charter, or instead were acting as domestic courts applying 
international law principles.83 A discussion paper issued by the Assembly 
of States Parties of the I.C.C. in September 2003 was then reviewed as 
it gave details of the on-going drafting work to establish a legal definition 
of aggression. The Court of Appeal concluded, in pertinent part : 
[W]e have already noted,... some of the problems which prevent the 
I.C.C. from having jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. One of 
the preconditions to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction in the 
[draft] definition is... that the Prosecutor has to ascertain whether the 
Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression 
committed by the state concerned. ... [Another] option for discussion 
enquires whether or not the Court can proceed with the case in the 
absence of any determination by the Security Council or whether it 
has to dismiss the case. It is difficult to see in these circumstances 
how it can be said that there is, accordingly, a firmly established rule 
of international law which establishes a crime of aggression which 
can be translated into domestic law as a crime in domestic law, where 
there is no consensus as to an essential element of the crime.84 
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Accordingly, the distinction between universal condemnation on the 
one hand, and international jurisdiction on the other, is mirrored in a 
corresponding distinction between prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction at domestic state level - at least, in the U.K. Although the 
International Criminal Courts Act 200185 provides the statutory basis in 
the U.K. for the domestic implementation of the three crimes already 
defined under the Rome Statute,86 there is as yet no clear legal basis 
for an international crime of aggression. This makes it impossible for 
conscientious objectors - either« partial » or« absolute »- to point to 
an « illegal » armed conflict, e.g., one not waged for national self-
defence, when seeking to prove the genuineness of their political opinion. 
3C. The « Competence » to Determine Aggression 
Even though the I.C.C. is to havejurisdiction to try persons for the crime 
of aggression at some point after 2009,87 the issue of the competence to 
determine a situation of aggression continues to raise difficulties. This 
issue was recently discussed at an informal inter-sessional meeting of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, held on 13 -15 
June 2005 at Princeton University, in New Jersey.88 The purpose of the 
session was to facilitate the work of the Special Working Group, and to 
reflect opinions and conclusions regarding different issues. It was also 
decided to establish an online « virtual working group »to allow ongoing 
discussions outside regular and other inter-sessional meetings.89 
Noting that the relevant provisions in the Rome Statute of the I.C.C. 
had been incorporated quite late in the drafting process, and « were 
not necessarily clear» as they were not the result of specific negotiation,90 
the participants in the working group focused their attention on a 2002 
discussion paper.91 This suggested that« determination of the existence 
of an act of aggression by an appropriate organ should be made a 
precondition for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction ... ».92 The 
possibilities reported included the U.N.S.C., the U.N.G.A., the I.C.J., 
and the Assembly of States Parties of the I.C.C. itself.93 
The working group again highlighted a central difficulty. Although the 
Security Council, pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter, has the primary 
responsibility to determine a breach of international peace and security,94 
some in the working group were concerned that handing the prior 
determination of aggression to that organ could effectively leave the 
new I.C.C. in a « state of paralysis ».95 As « the makers of the U.N. -
chief among which was the U.S. - created a political rather than a legal 
system' after World War 2,96 the Security Council need not view 
international law as a yardstick regarding domestic questions for Charter 
purposes.97 However, if competence to determine aggression is 
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transferred to the I.C.C. or is shared with the Security Council, the existing 
distribution of power and authority originally designed into the Charter 
is undermined. Even though the I.C.C. was created to act as a superior 
enforcement body,98 maintaining the status quo could equally undermine 
« the development of an autonomous definition of the crime of 
aggression, particularly where a body guided by political rather than 
legal considerations would make such a determination »." In any event. 
Article 13 of the Rome Statute gives further insight into the issue of 
competence, asjurisdiction is differently privileged, depending on the 
referring body: states, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, and/or independent Prosecutorial initiative.100 
The working group noted that the I.C.C. Prosecutor has competence 
to proceed with an independent investigation, unless prevented by 
Article 16 of the Statute.101 Article 16 allows the Security Council, acting 
by Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, to defer an 
investigation or prosecution for twelve months, renewable, thereby 
affecting referrals from states, as well. As each permanent member of 
the Security Council holds a veto power, even in situations involving 
itself, the permanent members and four non-permanent members must 
all first agree.102 The resulting potential for deadlock then has obvious 
implications for future armed conflicts such as that ongoing in Chechnya 
and the surrounding regions, over which the I.C.C. might someday 
wish to assert its competence. 
It was also noted that penalising an « attempt » to commit an act of 
aggression, while perhaps desirable, would prove problematic should 
a body other than the I.C.C. be charged with predetermining the crime103; 
the I.C.C. would need still to find sufficient grounds for prosecution in 
individual cases. Criminalising « attempt»further highlights the need 
for separate rights of defence of an accused.104 Other issues of present 
relevance include aggression as a « leadership crime » (excluding 
mere participants, such as soldiers executing orders),105 the distinction 
between state acts of aggression and individual participation in a 
collective act,106 and the legal position of a « leader » who could, but 
chooses not to prevent an act of aggression.107 
The fact that some states are better able than others to promote and 
wage war (e.g., the war on terror108) bodes ill for any growing political 
momentum to create an « autonomous definition of the crime of 
aggression ». What also emerges from these various points is that, 
once aggression has a legal definition, not only will military leaders 
face the need to protect their personnel from charges of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, but further, they will be placed 
in a position where they must also be prepared to challenge their 
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political masters regarding particular state uses of armed force. This 
will undoubtedly appear untenable to many, as following « superior 
orders » is a fundamental of military training.109 Until such a definition 
appears, however, the case for recognition of a human right - either 
« absolute » or« partial » - of conscientious objection is compelling. 
4. Economic and Human Consequences of Conscription 
On the issue of a « right» of conscientious objection, Lord Hoffman in 
Sepet waxed somewhat unsympathetically and certainly more concisely 
when reflecting on the potential for a personal conflict between 
conscience and a « duty »to the state. Comparing a refusal to serve in 
the military with other acts of civil disobedience, such as a targeted 
refusal to pay taxes, or a protest at new road building,110 he indicated 
that a risk of legal sanction always arises when laws are broken. It is of 
the essence of law, he seemed to intimate, that human activity is 
regulated. For example, an objection based on the human right to 
manifest a religion or belief, Lord Hoffman noted, could be limited so 
far as « necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others ».111 
However, and despite the obvious societal benefits provided by laws 
for taxation, road building, the protection of the public safety and strong 
individual freedoms, it is not the provision of public benefits, per se, 
that causes concern so much as the means adopted by which to make 
such provision. In other words, were thejudiciary to adopt a framework 
of analysis regarding compulsory conscription similar to that utilised 
to make justiciable the manner in which a war is waged, various disturbing 
aspects of democratic opacity could be made more distinguishable 
for purposes of recognising a «right» of conscientious objection, and 
by way of corollary, the acceptance of military-based claims for asylum 
on grounds of political conscience. In particular, while military 
conscription arguably provides a less expensive method to achieve 
military readiness, it is also one which shares many characteristics in 
common with involuntary servitude. Such pragmatic economic and 
human considerations are now examined. 
4A. The Economics of Conscription 
To point out that the industrial-financial balance of forces in conjunction 
with political-social factors largely determine overall state military expense 
is trite economics,112 but the focus then turns quickly towards examination 
of the economic model to be chosen for this purpose. In terms of resource 
allocation, state investment in arms-related industries may be a rational 
choice both for citizens and decision-makers as it promotes technological 
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advance. For example, the development of a military-industrial complex, 
so-called during the Cold War (albeit arguably apparent much earlier), 
became especially prominent in the U.S.S.R.113 However, and as noted 
by Giddens, military leaders and manufacturers in the U.S.S.R., as 
elsewhere (most notably the U.S.), were notorious for their combined 
influence over political choices and policies.114 
Despite the many changes in geopolitical circumstance since the end 
of the Cold War,115 it can still be argued that a close meshing of military 
and industrial interests remains apparent in many societies.116 In terms 
of finance, on-going developments in military hardware reflect the 
more-or-less fixed costs or benefits of production. Civilian spill-over 
effects or opportunities are also possible.117 However, a compulsory 
conscription system such as that in operation in Russia must by 
definition reduce the price of military readiness, by the transfer of 
personnel costs into economic externalities, rather than internalities.118 
Compulsory military conscription simply costs less, as does a subsidy-
or-surrogate system in which conscripts may buy themselves out of 
service obligations. According to a recent news report, the Russian 
defence ministry estimates that the Russian Federation calls-up about 
350,000 annually for compulsory military service, 90.5% of whom avoid 
or delay the draft (rising to 97% for Muscovites). While many young 
men manage to escape service, allegedly by paying money to senior 
officers,119 the Russian Defence Ministry maintains publicly that conscripts 
remain necessary until a system for paid volunteers can be instituted, 
at some point in the future.120 
In terms of the source of a power to compel, the formulation of national 
laws and rules is left to national constitutional arrangements, a task 
with which an elite minority is normally charged. How that minority is 
chosen will naturally vary from state to state, but compulsion can appear 
efficient if only to secure the state's monopoly on the use of armed 
force. The transition from private armies121 to state ones coincided with 
the slow development of modern international state-centric structures -
an historical occurrence fundamental to any understanding of the 
exercise of jurisdiction within state territory. The power to compel -
once made legally enforceable - requires no further negotiation as to 
its terms. The source of legal enforceability however may be somewhat 
less clear. 
At least in terms of economic function, then, a universal system of 
compulsory military service obviates the need for negotiation. This has 
its benefits. For example, paying for services costs money, as do 
military recruitment drives.122 If there is nothing to trade, a compulsory 
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system cannot reflect the full social costs, unlike a normal employment 
situation. When the time arrives to utilise national armed force either 
externally or internally, troop numbers already exist. Should a 
government rule by decree or intimidation, rather than by consent, 
revenue can be taken directly from the state's patrimony without levying 
taxes. A compulsory military thus allows a state to bypass the necessity 
for realistic taxation and exposes to the public gaze only the barest 
costing of military preparedness. 
War can then appear« cheaper»to wage, while the converse is true if 
labour costs are fully negotiated.123 However, as a non-transparent 
cost in the use of armed force, compulsion effectively facilitates the 
outbreak of war, and, in particular, « wars of choice ». As noted by 
Balakrishnan, « the terms for the production and appropriation of 
resources ... determine the agents and stakes of armed conflict »,124 so 
it is hardly surprisingly that states permitting rights of « absolute » 
conscientious objection do not extend this limited concession to 
« partial» objections during unpopular wars.125 However, Balakrishnan 
also queries « when do the costs and benefits of war make it a rational 
policy, for states refashioned under the economic discipline of 
capitalism » ?126 To be confined simply by contexts of state power 
when considering the power to compel, in other words, is to accept 
the premise that the political is both separate from and superior to the 
economic. 
This is so for various reasons. A lack of governmental accountability 
attributable to the absence of public negotiation concentrates power in 
elite hands. Unaccountable power can be used to obscure the basis of 
government decision-making. In relation to the use of force, public scrutiny 
of government policy or particular allocations of state finance becomes 
impossible. Hiding the costs of war in particular can have profound 
implications for weakened representative institutions, affording wider 
opportunities for corruption.127 It then becomes relevant to query whether 
and to what extent such unaccountable and non-negotiable concentrations 
of elite power might still possess a rational economic basis for resource 
allocation, or instead cause detriment to the overall welfare of the state, 
the public and society, and thus be viewed as illegitimate. 
Fully-costed or not, a war may be thrust upon a state, as in one for 
national defence. Such an emergency situation is different if only on 
the basis that« wars of choice » are not so easily aligned to « a logic of 
accumulation ».128 Should the governed for example give their consent 
to require the state to tax them for adequate military protection (or 
road building), not only is there then the possibility of closer public 
scrutiny as to how public money is spent, but« wars of necessity » (as 
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in national self-defence) and « wars of choice » (including so-called 
imperialist campaigns) become more clearly distinguishable. Once 
taxpayers pay in full for their military personnel, economically efficient 
behaviour would then tend to dictate specific strategies, such as (1) 
recruit a career military for whom training and equipment are not wasted 
through a rapid turnover or high attrition rate, (2) employ only the 
poorest, and/or (3) scrutinise the causes to which fully-costed military 
expenditure is dedicated. It thus can be argued that a legitimate legal 
source for the state's power to compel can only arise if there is a direct 
relationship between taxation, representation, and expenditure. 
A fully-costed military can also be characterised as a rational economic 
choice due to greater transparency in the value (price?) attributable to 
individual human life. Compulsory military conscription in this precise 
context is inefficient in terms of resource allocation, unless human 
resources are not scarce or are otherwise deemed by the public to be 
of little value. As noted in pertinent part by Lord Hoffman, in Sepet, 
(...)[T]he objector's religious, moral or political feelings are only 
part of a complex judgement that includes the pragmatic question 
as to whether compelling conscientious objectors to enlist or suffer 
punishment will do more harm than good. Among the other relevant 
factors are the following: first, martyrs attract sympathy, particularly 
if they suffer on religious grounds in a country which takes religion 
seriously; secondly, unwilling soldiers may not be very effective; 
thirdly, they tend to be articulate people who may spread their views 
in the ranks; fourthly, modern military technology requires highly 
trained specialists and not masses of unskilled men.129 
Clearly, compulsory military service is difficult to justify economically 
unless it is can be balanced against the manifold requirements of a 
modern army, a society based on civilian control and legitimacy, human 
rights and the rule of law. The absence in many states of fully-costed, 
economically-transparent policies also adds more weight to the need 
for a « right » of conscientious objection, which a « power-politics » 
approach to military conscription will never provide. It is equally clear 
that it is the opaque politics and economics, underlying some wars 
that lead many « partial » objectors to desert. 
4B. Conscription and Involuntary Servitude 
In light of U.N. Charter Article 2(4), it can be argued theoretically that 
each and every individual has a right to refuse to participate in an 
international armed conflict, unless it is authorised by the U.N. Security 
Council.130 However, Charter Article 51 memorialises the notional duty 
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of individuals to participate in the armed defence of their country of 
allegiance if it is attacked. The boundary between the two makes distinct 
those national constitutional traditions which utilise, on the one hand, 
a theory of natural law stressing man's duties to the sovereign, and on 
the other, those which extend such theories to encompass man's rights 
against his sovereign and everyone else.131 
International laws ultimately can work for the benefit of individuals, but 
none at present give any specific insight into military conscription. In 
view of the statistics indicated earlier,132 many deserters such as AK 
and Sepet are essentially unable to apply for alternative civilian or other 
non-combatant work when called-up for military service, nor can they 
substantiate easily a claim to refugee status abroad after evading service. 
While this may raise several questions in relation to compelling 
participation in mortally dangerous activities, one question in particular 
needs to be addressed. Specifically, how can it still be the case, in an 
era of« equal» human rights, that compulsory military service is excluded 
from the scope of the prohibition against involuntary servitude? 
In Sepet, the central issue to which the Court of Appeal was directed 
was whether conscientious objection to compulsory military service 
could, without more, found an asylum claim under Article 1 A(2) of the 
Convention. As noted earlier, one argument in support of this contention 
was that a fundamental« human right» of conscientious objection had 
emerged, as recognised for« a long time » by the U.N.H.C.R.133 Before 
concluding that no such right - fundamental or otherwise - could yet 
be found to exist, the Court was directed to the possible sources of 
such a «right»: academic materials, treaties, United Nations materials, 
European materials, the practice of states, the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, and relevant jurisprudence. 
The Court found there was, on the one hand, an acceptance (express or 
implied) that military service is excluded from a characterisation of 
involuntary servitude,134 and on the other, a steadily-growing, but 
essentially political impetus for states to provide some measure of 
conscientious objector status, or alternative civilian or non-combatant 
duties.135 There is no « right » (fundamental or otherwise) to claim 
exemption from military service for reasons of conscience. As for 
U.N.H.C.R. recognition of such a right«for a long time », the Handbook, 
paragraph 173, rather sets a different tone, stating in pertinent part that 
An increasing number of States have introduced legislation or 
administrative regulations whereby persons who can invoke genuine 
reasons of conscience are exempted from military service, either 
entirely or subject to their performing alternative (i.e., civilian) service. 
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(...). In the light of these developments, it would be open to 
Contracting States, to grant refugee status to persons who object 
to performing military service for genuine reasons of conscience. 
Accordingly, the choice to adopt a system of compulsory military 
service or not remains within the reserved domain of states rights. 
Inasmuch as some treaty obligations are less capable than others of 
binding the ruler as well as the ruled, compulsory military systems differ 
in their operation. Modern contexts of government restraint in relation 
to the treatment of individuals, even when the subject of treaty 
obligation, generally remain a matter for domestic state governance 
until the Security Council intervenes. 
There is thus judicial acknowledgement that states have the power to 
compel citizens to bear arms, and lose their lives, for any purpose 
whatsoever. Yet, while some compulsory civic duties, such as paying 
taxes or building new roads, can be viewed as essential to a well-
ordered society, not all perhaps should be. For example, those building 
roads typically are hired at market rates for their labour,136 the costs of 
which are internalised. A bid for the job is determined accordingly. 
Assuming that conscripts are paid on much lower scales (if that) than a 
voluntary force, it soon seems odd, if only at a basic level of logic, that 
courts appear unwilling to break an equivalent approach to compulsion 
despite the different outcomes of this facet of state power over the 
individual. In other words, compulsory participation in the military (e.g., 
« equality of sacrifice », etc.) is difficult to equate with other civic duties. 
In a competitive market, the provision of public goods through « coercive 
surplus extraction »- taxation being one form - represents a market failure. 
Market failures are attributed by many economists to the absence of 
clearly-defined property rights.137 Once there is a property or ownership 
interest, a corresponding right of sale internalises what was previously a 
transactional externality. « Rights » of sale must be preceded, however, 
by political choices as to what can be legally owned. Yet, while economics 
can instruct one in how to think, economic choices are made politically. 
Employment markets operate along these lines. Individuals are deemed 
to « own » their labour, and to be in a position to negotiate its value 
competitively, but many states provide for a minimum wage. 
In contrast, the absence of negotiation rights is evidence that there is 
no property to sell or transfer. To return to the example of road-building, 
it is obvious that individuals or groups of citizens are unlikely to build 
public roads independently, if only because the tolls then needed to 
recoup the outlay would render the roads less public, i.e., only those 
able to pay could use them. Compulsory taxation is therefore mandated 
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to address this market failure, pay competitive labour market costs, 
and supply a collective good. Legitimate representative politics demand 
that the public must first require the government to tax it for this purpose 
-the «free »road. In contrast, a non-negotiable system of conscription 
short-circuits the foundation step of a public demand for realistic 
taxation. Less taxation to fund government decision-making obscures 
the amounts available to spend, resulting in inadequate public oversight 
of government decision-making. Although war then might be «freer» 
for the elite to use, any resulting collective good becomes more difficult 
to discern, as does governmental legitimacy. 
Compulsion limits personal autonomy. If compulsion results from public 
consultation to provide a collective good, it is less objectionable. 
However, as compulsory extractions from surplus generated by 
individual property, such as wage taxation, can supply collective goods, 
there is a direct comparison to be made between slave emancipation 
and compulsory conscription. As late as 1926, Article 1 (1) of the Slavery 
Convention138 defined slavery as «the status or condition of a person over 
whom any or all of the powers of the right of ownership are exercised ».139 
Demetz posits that a firm using slave labour is not liable to the full 
costs of its activities, as wages will be at subsistence levels, if that. The 
private costing of slavery alters dramatically however as the law permits 
a right of sale. If the slave is allowed to buy his (or her) freedom, the 
market for labour internalises costs more efficiently as the market 
becomes more competitive. He concludes: «the transition from serf 
to free man in feudal Europe is an example of this process ».140 
While it may well be the case that the various international instruments 
pertaining to involuntary servitude and human rights exclude military 
service either expressly or impliedly,141 it is alarming that any interest an 
adult citizen has in his or her personal autonomy is ever deemed beyond 
negotiation. The courts are able only to view as persecution a fear of 
punishment which results from a refusal to serve if that refusal is premised 
on the inhumane manner in which a particular war is fought. Yet, of the 
three possible arguments on which to found a post-desertion case for 
asylum indicated throughout this discussion, it is thejudicial acceptance 
of compulsory military service that possibly does most harm. The right 
to life is a fundamental one. Obviously, if a person wishes to volunteer 
for military purposes in his or her state of allegiance, that is that person's 
individual choice, but it is the plight of the individual objector that best 
highlights the political limits of law in relation to war, and in particular, 




Although U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 51 are an attempt to restrain 
the right of states to engage in the use of armed force, there is as yet 
no legal definition of« aggression ». The I.C.C. will havejurisdiction to 
try crimes of aggression at some point after 2009, but an important 
preliminary step towards this result is proving problematic - that of the 
competence to determine a situation in which aggression has occurred. 
There are laws constraining the means and methods to be used in an 
armed conflict, but these have been until recently far more rigorously 
applied in relation to international armed conflicts than to internal, or 
civil ones. The I.C.C. has « complementary »jurisdiction over crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes which do not reflect this separation, 
but that forum is as yet relatively untested. 
It is not until law is applied to the facts of human existence that its 
strengths and weaknesses become apparent. To be recognised as a 
refugee, one must have fled one's own country of nationality or of 
habitual residence.142 Modern developments in international humanitarian 
law are directed to sparing both participants and civilians from the 
excesses of war, but there is no automatic entitlement to refugee status 
due solely to the consequences of an armed conflict.143 A person must 
also have, and prove, a well-founded fear of persecution were he or 
she to be returned. For the Convention to apply, the reasons for a 
well-founded fear of persecution must fall within the definition contained 
in Article 1 A(2). The consequences of an armed conflict can thus only 
provide some evidence of such reasons ; « something more », that is 
personal, and individual, must exist. 
The Convention is silent as to the position of conscientious objectors, 
and the Handbook merely invites states « to grant refugee status to 
persons who object to performing military service for genuine reasons 
of conscience ».144 As for that« something more » required over and 
above the consequences of a war, the Handbook states « it is not 
enough for a person to be in disagreement with his government 
regarding the political justification for a particular military action ».145 
Moreover, there apparently is no « human right » of conscientious 
objection, either - either « absolute » or « partial ». 
So, « aggression » is non-justiciable, there is no automatic refugee 
status for those fleeing the consequences of a war, and there is no right 
of conscientious objection. Despite the daily precautions that individuals 
are required to take to preserve their levels of civil autonomy, they are 
in effect powerless either to stop a war and/or to avoid dying in it. The 
lives of individuals remain essentially forfeit to the demands of the state. 
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While it is true that the survival of states is a matter of huge importance, there 
remain questions regarding the extent to which states are « entitled » 
to go in their efforts to survive. It is thus that the Handbook, in paragraph 
171, qualifies its approach to military objection in relation to « types of 
military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated ». 
In turn, this «type of military action »is to be one which «is condemned 
by the international community as contrary to the basic rules of human 
conduct ». 
Laws which are unclear as to their substance are likely to be litigated 
more frequently. The Handbook certainly does not have the force of 
law, yet it suggests that an inhumanely-fought war can open the door 
to refugee status if a well-founded fear of persecution is premised on a 
« political opinion as to the limits of governmental authority ».146 This 
persuasive guidance would imply that« man's rights against his sovereign 
and everyone else » can trump « man's duties to the sovereign ».147 
Conversely, compulsory military service is rendered no less 
objectionable by the fact that military service is excluded from a 
characterisation of involuntary servitude. 
It may well be that a fully participating, representative society, such 
that the public collectively can retain the right of control over all 
government decision-making and hence government control over 
individuals, simply cannot exist. Nonetheless, any aspect of individual 
life which is made non-negotiable through power politics opens the 
door to state abuse. 'Wars of choice' become easier to wage, the 
right to life is reduced from a fundamental one to something more 
disposable, and people are left to save themselves however best they 
can. As noted earlier, it is the non-transparent political policies and 
economic choices that lead many objectors to desert. As a result, and 
until there is a clear law which recognises, cedes, or otherwise creates 
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On 29 October 2004, a Russian military deserter from the war in Chechnya was 
granted political asylum in the United Kingdom. This was a problematic case for the 
authorities, not least because the deserter claimed a conscientious objection only to 
fighting that particular war. 
There is no automatic refugee status for those fleeing the consequences of a war. To 
qualify as a refugee pursuant to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol, an asylum seeker must prove that he or 
she was a well-founded fear of persecution if returned. In this desertion-asylum case, 
a well-founded fear of persecution was deemed to arise from the asylum applicant's 
political opinion as to the limits of government authority, e.g., the utilisation of types of 
military action « condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic 
rules of human conduct ». 
It is of concern, however, that this case provides no authority for the existence of a 
« human right » of conscientious objection to military service, despite the fact that 
« wars of necessity » and « wars of choice » are difficult to distinguish legally. It is thus 
argued that the non-existence of a « right » to object allows « wars of choice » to be 
waged more easily. Further, compulsory service permits a form of involuntary servitude 
to persist, and conceals the true costs war in economic and human terms. For these 
reasons, it is concluded, this problematic type of case is likely to re-occur. 
RESUME 
LE DROIT D'ASILE ET LES « GUERRES DE CHOIX » 
Le 29 octobre 2004, le Royaume-Uni a octroye I'asile politique a un deserteur russe 
de la guerre de Tchetchenie. Ce cas s'est av6re probiematique pour les autorites, 
surtout parce que le deserteur ne revendiquait son objection de conscience que par 
rapport a cette guerre bien precise. 
II n'existe pas de statut automatique de refugie pour ceux qui fuient les consequences 
de la guerre. Pour obtenir la quality de refugie conformement a la Convention des 
Nations Unies de 1951 relative au statut des reTugies, ainsi qu'a son protocole de 
1967, un demandeur d'asile doit prouver qu'il ou elle craignait avec raison d'etre 
pers6cut6e(e) en cas de retour. Dans ce cas de desertion-demande d'asile, il a ete 
consider qu'une crainte justifiee d'etre persecute existait en raison de I'opinion 
politique du demandeur d'asile concernant les limites de I'autorite du gouvernement, 
par exemple, par rapport a I'emploi de methodes de guerre « condamnees par la 
communaute internationale comme etant contraires aux regies de base du 
comportement humain ». 
II est cependant inquietant de constater que ce cas ne legitime pas I'existence d'un 
« droit humain » d'objection de conscience par rapport au service militaire, bien qu'il 
soit difficile d'etablir une distinction du point de vuejuridique entre les « guerres de 
necessite » et les « guerres de choix ». L'auteur argumente ensuite que la non-
existence d'un « droit » a I'objection de conscience permet de mener plus facilement 
des « guerres de choix ». En outre, le service militaire obligatoire permet la persistance 
d'une forme de servitude involontaire et par ailleurs occulte les coCits veritables de la 
guerre au plan economique et humain. Par consequent, la conclusion est que de tels 
cas probiematiques sont susceptibles de se reproduce a I'avenir. 
82 
NO COMITY IN ERROR : ASYLUM AND « WARS OF CHOICE » 
SAMENVATTING 
BIJ MISVATTING GEEN WEDERKERIGHEID : ASIEL EIM « OORLOG UIT 
VRIJE WIL » 
Op 29 oktober 2004 werd in Groot-Brittannie politiek asiel verleend aan een Russische 
deserteur die de oorlog in Tsjetsjenie ontvlucht was. Voor de overheden was dit een 
zeer problematische zaak, aangezien de deserteur enkel in deze specifieke oorlog 
weigerde mee te vechten. 
Er bestaat geen automatisch asielrecht voor personen die de gevolgen van een oorlog 
ontvluchten. Om als vluchteling beschouwd te worden volgens het Verdrag van de 
Verenigde Naties betreffende de Status van Vluchtelingen (1951) en zijn protocol 
(1967), moet een asielaanvrager kunnen bewijzen dat hij/zij wegens gegronde redenen 
een vervolging te vrezen heeft, indien hjj/zij teruggestuurd zou worden. In dit geval van 
desertie resp. asielaanvraag werd erkend dat er sprake was van een gegronde vrees 
voor vervolging op basis van de politieke mening van de asielaanvrager omtrent de 
competentie van de regering. Een voorbeeld hiervan zjjn de gebruikte methoden van 
oorlogsvoering die « door de international gemeenschap veroordeeld werden, omdat 
ze in strijd waren met de basisprincipes van menselijk handelen ». 
Het is echter verontrustend dat dit geval het bestaan van een « mensenrecht » om 
dienst te weigeren wegens gewetensbezwaren niet rechtvaardigt, hoewel 
« noodzakelijke oorlogen » en « oorlogen uit vrije wil » juridisch gezien moeilijk te 
onderscheiden zijn. Er wordt dus bewezen dat het ontbreken van een « recht» om 
dienst te weigeren het voeren van « oorlogen uit vrije wil » gemakkelijker maakt. 
Bovendien creeert de dienstplicht het bestaan van een soort onwillekeurige slavernij, 
en worden daardoor de werkelijke kosten van de oorlogsvoering op economisch en 
menseljjk vlak verborgen. Om deze redenen kan men tot de conclusie komen dat 
dergelijke problematische gevallen zich hoogstwaarschjjnlijk nog zullen herhalen. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
IM IRRTUM KEINE WECHSELSEITIGKEIT : ASYL UND « GEWAHLTE 
KRIEGE » 
Am 29. Oktober 2004 wurde einem russischen Fahnenfliichtigen, der dem Krieg in 
Tschetschenien entfloh, politisches Asyl in GroBbritannien gewahrt. Fur die Behdrden 
war der Fall nicht zuletzt deshalb problematisch, weil der Fahnenfliichtige nur in 
diesem besonderen Krieg den Wehrdienst verweigern wollte. 
Fiir diejenigen, die den Folgen eines Krieges entfliehen, besteht kein automatisches 
Fluchtlingsrecht. Um nach dem Abkommen iiber die Rechtsstellung der Fliichtlinge 
(1951) und seinem Protokoll (1967) als Fluchtling zu gelten, muB ein(e) Asylbewerber(in) 
beweisen, daB er/sie eine fundierte Furcht vor Verfolgung hat, falls er/sie zuriickgeschickt 
werden sollte. In diesem Fahnenflucht- bzw. Asylfall wurde anerkannt, daB eine fundierte 
Furcht vor Verfolgung aufgrund der politischen Meinung des Asylbewerbers Liber die 
Grenzen von Regierungsbefugnissen bestand, z.B. beziiglich der Verwendung von 
Methoden der Kriegsfuhrung, die « von der internationalen Gemeinschaft verurteilt worden 
waren, weil sie gegen die Grundregeln des menschlichen Verhaltens verstoBen ». 
Beunruhigend ist aber, daB dieser Fall die Existenz eines « Menschenrechts » der 
Wehrdienstverweigerung aus Gewissensgrunden nicht begrundet, obwohl « notwendige 
Kriege » und « gewahlte Kriege »juristisch schwer zu unterscheiden sind. Es wird also im 
folgenden argumentiert, daB das Nichtvorhandensein eines « Rechts » der Verweigerung 
die Fiihrung von « gewahlten Kriegen » leichter macht. AuBerdem ermSglicht der 
obligatorische Wehrdienst das Bestehen einer Art unwillkiirlicher Knechtschaft, und dazu 
noch verheimlicht er die eigentlichen Kosten der Kriegsfuhrung in wirtschaftlicher und 
menschlicher Hinsicht. Aus diesen Grunden wird zu dem SchluB gekommen, daB solche 




EL DERECHO DE ASILO Y LAS « GUERRAS DE ELECCION » 
El dfa 29 de octubre de 2004, el Reino Unido otorgo el asilo politico a un desertor 
ruso de la guerra de Chechenia. Este caso resultrj problematico para las autoridades, 
especialmente porque el desertor no reivindicaba su objecipn de consciencia sino 
para esta guerra bien determinada. 
No existe ninguno estatuto automStico de refugiado para alguien que huye de las 
consecuencias de la guerra. Para obtener la calidad de refugiado conforme a la 
Convencidn de las Naciones Unidas de 1951 sobre el estatuto de los refugiados, y su 
Protocolo de 1967, el solicitante de asilo tiene que demostrar que debido a fundados 
temores de ser perseguido no pueda regresar a su pals de origen. Si el solicitante 
de asilo es tambien desertor, se considera que habfa un temor fundado de ser 
perseguido por razdn de la opinion polltica del solicitante de asilo en cuanto a las 
limites de la autoridad del gobierno, por ejemplo, en cuanto al empleo de metodos 
de guerra « condenados por la comunidad internacional porque violan las reglas 
basicas del comportamiento humano ». 
Sin embargo, resulta preocupante constatar que este caso no legitima la existencia de 
un « derecho humano » a la objecidn de consciencia frente al servicio militar, aunque 
desde el punto de vista juridico sea diflcil distinguir entre las « guerras de necesidad 
» y las « guerras de eleccidn ». El autor se refiere entonces al argumento que la no-
existencia de un « derecho » a la objeciOn de consciencia permite lanzarse mas 
facilmente en « guerras de election ». Ademas el servicio militar obligatorio implica la 
persistencia de una forma de servidumbre involuntaria y oculta tambien los gastos 
reales de la guerra al nivel econdmico y humano. Por consecuencia, el autor llega a la 
conclusion que casos problemalicos similares volver^ n a producirse en el futuro. 
RIASSUNTO 
IL DIRITTO D'ASILO E LE « GUERRE PER SCELTA » 
II 29 ottobre 2004 il Regno Unito ha concesso asilo politico ad un militare russo, 
disertore della guerra in Cecenia. Questo caso e stato fonte di problemi per le 
autorita, soprattutto perche il militare rivendicava la sua obiezione di coscienza soltanto 
rispetto alia guerra in Cecenia e non ad altri conflitti: non esiste infatti uno status di 
profugo da conferirsi automaticamente a coloro che, in via generale, fuggono dalle 
conseguenze di un conflitto. 
Per ottenere la qualita di profugo, in conformita con la Convenzione delle Nazioni 
Unite del 1951 e relativo protocollo del 1967, un candidato all'asilo deve provare che 
egli/ella abbia ragione di temere d'essere perseguitato/a in caso di ritorno al paese 
d'origine. Nel caso di specie, la paura del disertore di essere perseguitato e stata 
considerata giustificata in ragione dell'opinione politica del candidato stesso. Tale 
opinione infatti si estendeva a critiche sulla legittimita delle scelte politiche del governo 
russo, ad esempio, rispetto all'uso di metodi di guerra «condannati dalla Comunita 
internazionale come contrari alle regole di base del comportamento umano». 
E tuttavia inquietante constatare che questo caso non legittima I'esistenza di un 
«diritto umano» all'obiezione di coscienza rispetto al servizio militare, bench6 sia 
difficile stabilire una distinzione dal punto di vista giuridico tra «guerre intraprese per 
necessita» e «guerre intraprese per scelta». L'autore sostiene che la non esistenza di 
un «diritto» all'obiezione di coscienza permette di qualificare pifj facilmente i conflitti 
come «guerre intraprese per scelta». Inoltre, il servizio militare obbligatorio fa si che 
si crei una forma di servitu involontaria e che si occultino i costi veri della guerra sul 
piano economico ed umano. Le conclusioni riportano come tali casi problematic! 
siano suscettibili di riprodursi in futuro. 
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